University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2021

Miranda Is Dead. Long Live Miranda
Michael Vitiello
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, mvitiello@pacific.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Vitiello, Miranda Is Dead. Long Live Miranda, 54 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 59, 60 (2021)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

MIRANDA IS DEAD. LONG LIVE MIRANDA
Michael Vitiello*
I.

IN TR OD U CTION ..................................................................................

59

II.

ON THE ROAD TO MIRANDA ..............................................................

63

III. ON THE ROAD TO A NEAR-DEATH EXPERIENCE AND BEYOND............ 69

IV . BACK TO THE BEGINNING? ................................................................
V . C ON CL U SIO N ........................................................................................

75
87

I. INTRODUCTION

Miranda v. Arizona is iconic.' It played a major role in determining the
outcome of the 1968 presidential election.2 Richard Nixon's election led to
significant changes in the makeup of the Supreme Court.3 Since then, the
post-Warren Courts have gutted Miranda.4
Despite its failings, Miranda attempted to solve real problems in the
administration of criminal justice. 5 Beginning in 1932, the Supreme Court
* Michael Vitiello, Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of the Pacific McGeorge School
of Law; University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I would like to
acknowledge my gratitude and respect for the late Professor Loewy. His invitation to participate in the
annual survey on three occasions was not only a great honor but also a measure that I had become a "friend
of Arnold." His death marks a great loss for the Texas Tech Law School, the legal academy, and his many
friends. I also want to thank my research assistant Joanne Gothard for her excellent help with this Article
1. See generallyMirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning
Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (1985) (asserting the importance of Miranda); Miranda v.
Arizona, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Miranda-v-Arizona (last visited Sept. 8, 2021)
(illustrating the Court's continued acceptance of Miranda); The Miranda Rights are Established, HIST.,

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-miranda-rights-are-established
(last visited Sept. 8,
2021) (explaining how Miranda established fundamental rights); Landmark Cases: Miranda v. Arizona,
THIRTEEN, https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/landmark_miranda.html

(last visited Sept.

8, 2021) (describing the reconciliation of police powers and individual rights due to Miranda).
2. See generally Michael Vitiello, Introducingthe Warren Court'sCriminalProcedureRevolution:
A 50-Year Retrospective, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 621 (2020).

3.

Id. at 626.

4.

Michael Vitiello, Arnold Loewy, Ernesto Miranda, Earl Warren, and Donald Trump:

Confessions and the Fifth Amendment, 52 TEX. TECH L. REV. 63, 72-75 (2019) (discussing the Supreme
Court's continued attempts to cabin Miranda); see, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972)
(holding that a stricter standard of proof is unnecessary to prove that the confession was voluntary); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 657-58 (1984) (holding that defendant's initial statement was
admissible despite not being read his Miranda rights); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985)
(deciding that a violation of Miranda rights did not bar admissibility); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.
370, 382, 388-89 (2010) (holding that "a suspect who has received and understood the Mirandawarnings,
and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced
statement to the police").
5.

Arnold H. Loewy, The Supreme Court, Confessions, and JudicialSchizophrenia, 44 SAN DIEGO

L. REV. 427, 435 (2007).
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began reviewing cases where defendants confessed under questionable
circumstances. 6 Over the next thirty years, the Court decided over thirty cases
involving the voluntariness of a defendant's confession.' Often those cases
arose in the south, involving African American defendants.' Often the
defendants faced the death penalty.9
Beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, the Court relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to determine whether a defendant's
confession was voluntary.' 0 The Court's many opinions left lower courts with
little guidance." What values guided the Court? For example, is due process
violated only by certain police practices, or is it also violated when the
defendant's confession is unreliable, leading to the potential of the conviction
of an innocent defendant? 2 The Court seemed to waver on such issues. 3
Beyond that, what factors demonstrate that a confession is involuntary?
Brown would be, in retrospect, the only easy case that the Court decided. In
that case, a sheriff's deputy admitted beating the suspects.' 4 But what about
psychological coercion? 5 Or what about a suspect whose mental capacity
limited his ability to deal with police pressure? 6
In Miranda, the Court attempted to solve these problems with its
voluntariness case law.'" Warning a suspect of the right to remain silent and
to have counsel present seemingly addressed concerns about the uncertainty
of voluntariness.' 8 If suspects invoked those rights, they would not be subject
to having their will overridden-or so the Court seemed to hope.1 9 Invoking
6. See PAUL FINKELMAN & CARY D. WINTZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY,
1896 TO THE PRESENT: FROM THE AGE OF SEGREGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 509 (2009);

see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (reversing after defendants were denied counsel);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (reversing when the defendant's confessions were
procured by coercion).
7.

See Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of

Police Interrogation,48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 745, 749, 754 (1987).
8. Id. at 747.
9. Id. at 746-47.
10. Brown, 297 U.S. at 279.
11. Herman, supra note 7, at 746.
12.

See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE

C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

PRINCIPLES,

POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 600, 603 (6th ed. 2017); see also, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
163 (1986) (stating that "coercive government misconduct" violates the Due Process Clause); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959) (reversing the use of an involuntary confession when defendant was
repeatedly denied access to his attorney).
13.

See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supranote 12; see also, e.g., Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163 (stating that

"coercive government misconduct" violates the Due Process Clause); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324 (reversing
the use of an involuntary confession when the defendant was repeatedly denied access to his attorney).
14. Brown, 297 U.S. at 284.
15. See, e.g., Spano, 360 U.S. at 319-20.
16. See, e.g., Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164.
17. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-66 (1966); Arnold H. Loewy, Distinguishing
Confessions Obtained in Violation of the Fifth Amendmentfrom Those Obtainedin Violation of the Sixth
Amendment, 50 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 145, 152 (2017).

18.
19.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69, 491, 524.
Id.
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the right to court-appointed counsel during the interrogation process put poor
defendants on a comparable footing with wealthier defendants. 2
Critics attacked the deeply divided MirandaCourt immediately. 21 Some
questioned whether confessions would dry up, leaving guilty defendants at
large. 22 In reliance on statements in the lead opinion, critics argued that
Miranda lacked constitutional legitimacy. 2 3
Such criticisms resonated with the public when many feared rising
crime rates and inner-city riots. 24 Richard Nixon successfully rode his
law-and-order theme to the presidency. 25 In part because of President Lyndon
Johnson's political miscalculations, 26 Nixon made four appointments to the

20.

See Caplan, supra note 1, at 1457-58; see also Michael G. Heitz, The Rights ofa Witness Before

the GrandJury, 43 Mo. L. REV. 714, 721 (1978) (discussing the risks of appearing before a grand jury
without counsel).
21. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1057, 1062-63 (1998)
[hereinafterA Thirty-Year Perspective];see also Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the
Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of EmpiricalEvidence of Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement,

97 B.U. L. REV. 685, 848 (2017) [hereinafterA Review ofFifty Years] (concluding restraints placed on
law enforcement by Mirandahave made law enforcement less effective); Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar
Privilege in HistoricalPerspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2629-30 (1996)
(arguing that the Court lacks constitutional authority to supervise the administration of state criminal
justice); Loewy, supra note 5, at 434-35 (arguing that Miranda does not, but should, adequately protect
the adversary process).
22. See William W. Berry, Magnifying Miranda, 50 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 97, 100 (2017); see also A
Thirty-Year Perspective, supra note 21, at 1060 (claiming Miranda undercut the abilities of law
enforcement). But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
23. See Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda CaselawReally Inconsistent?A ProposedFifth Amendment
Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 19, 20 (2000).
24. See Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Causes of Crime, 38 PUB. OP. Q. 288, 292 (1974) (listing 1969

Louis Harris & Assoc. poll showing 51% and 23% of Americans believed "Supreme Court decisions
protecting rights of accused" were a "Major Cause" and "Minor Cause" of "an increase in crime,"
respectively); id. at 294 (detailing a Gallup poll showing 63% of Americans in 1968, and 75% of
Americans in 1969, believed "the courts" were not dealing "harshly enough" with criminals."); see also
James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The FirstFive Years, THE ATL. MONTHLY, May 1972, at 63,

http://jfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg%20Subject%20Index%2OFiles/F%/`2ODisk/FBI/FBI%2OCrime/I
tem%2001.pdf; see generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 299 (1970) (detailing

increases in frequency of criminal activity during this period).
25.

See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 224 (1983) (describing how during his

speech accepting the Republican presidential nomination, Nixon promised voters "that 'the wave of crime
is not going to be the wave of the future in the United States of America,' that the restoration of law and
order would be a linchpin of his administration.").
26.

See, e.g., John Massaro, LBJ and the FortasNominationfor ChiefJustice, 97 POL. SCI.

Q.

603,

621 (1982) (evaluating ways in which "it was poor presidential management rather than ideology that was
the primary factor leading to the Senate's refusal to confirm Abe Fortas"); KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON'S
COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 17-36 (2011)

(arguing Johnson's selection of Fortas, "a case of gross political malpractice," tipped the scales in favor
of Richard Nixon securing the Republican Party's 1968 presidential nomination, thereafter the general
election and the ability to appoint Justices).
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Court between 1969 and 1971.27 Those Justices, along with some Miranda
dissenters, began Miranda's erosion.28
After a near-death experience in 1977, Miranda would eventually
survive the claim that it lacked constitutional authority. 29 Ironically, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, appointed in part to overrule Miranda, wrote the opinion
"saving" Miranda.30 That fact alone suggests how post-Warren Courts gutted
Miranda.
Although many defense attorneys and scholars failed to recognize the
fact initially, the Court's voluntariness case law remained in play. 31 As the
Court eroded Miranda, voluntariness case law has become increasingly
important.3 2 Compliance with Miranda as reconstituted by the post-Warren
Courts is easy.33 Police conduct after a Miranda waiver now often becomes
a defendant's best basis for challenging a confession. 34
That takes courts and attorneys back to the beginning. Between 1966,
when it decided Miranda, and the present, the Court has seldom addressed
voluntariness. 35 Thus, lower courts have little guidance on how to assess due
process claims. 36 This Article explores some of these developments and tries

27.
Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.go
v/about/memberstext.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
28. See EARL M. MALTZ, THE COMING OF THE NIXON COURT: THE 1972 TERM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2016); see also, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,

489-90 (1972) (holding that the State merely had to surpass a preponderance of the evidence standard to
prove a suspect waived his Miranda rights); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (holding
that a statement which was inadmissible against defendant in the prosecution's case in chief because
defendant had not been advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent prior to making statement but
which otherwise satisfied legal standards of trustworthiness was properly usable for impeachment
purposes to attack credibility of defendant's trial testimony).
29. See infra Part II (discussing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1976)).
30. See Yale Kamisar, The Miranda Case Fifty Years Later, B.U.L. REV. 1293, 1294-95 (2017); see
also Dickersonv. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431 (2000).
31. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 876 (1971).
32. See Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309, 312-14 (2003).
33. See id. at 309-12; see also William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 987
(2001).
34. See Slobogin, supra note 32, at 310; see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96
CALIF. 1519, 1549 (2008).
35. E.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1991) (demonstrating one of the few instances
where the Court decided a case based on the involuntariness of the defendant's confession); see also
Weisselberg, supra note 34, at 1523; Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. 673, 74445 (1992) (stating Miranda may have "served to insulate the resulting confessions from claims that they
were coerced or involuntary"); George C. Thomas III, The End ofthe Roadfor Miranda v. Arizona?: On
the History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation,37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000) ("Once a
suspect waives Miranda (and most do), the routinized Miranda ritual lulls judges into admitting
confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness."). Welsh White could find only nine cases in a recent
two-year period in which confessions obtained after a waiver were excluded, and four of these were based
on state constitutional grounds. Welsh S. White, Miranda 's Failure to Restrain PerniciousInterrogation
Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2001). White concluded that "[a] finding that the police have
properly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights thus often has the effect of minimizing or eliminating
the scrutiny applied to post-waiver interrogation practices." Id. at 1220.
36. See infra Part II (discussing some of the issues affecting lower courts).
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to sort out how courts might resolve such claims in ways that provide
coherence. 37
Part II briefly reviews the road to Mirandaand its core holdings. 38 Part
III examines some of the ways in which post-Warren Courts have cabined
Miranda, leaving it almost unrecognizable. 39 Part IV focuses on the
resurgence of voluntariness cases and explores how courts might rethink the
assessment of the admissibility of confessions to bring more coherence to the
inquiry. 40
II. ON THE ROAD TOMIRANDA

The story of the road from Brown v. Mississippi41 to Miranda is
familiar. 42 Nonetheless, that narrative is important for this Article.
Brown presented to the Supreme Court a startling example of racial
injustice. Local authorities arrested three African-American tenant farmers
for the murder of a white planter. 43 The evidence at trial consisted almost
exclusively of the defendants' confessions. 44 As the State's witnesses
admitted, the deputies whipped the defendants to secure their confessions. 45
For only the second time, the Supreme Court reversed state criminal
convictions. 4 6 In Brown, the Court held that the use of a confession procured
through police violence was inadmissible because its use violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47
No doubt, Brown did not end police violence in securing confessions. 48
But seldom were police so willing to testify that they used violence to extract
confessions. 49 The cases after Brown presented the Court with different kinds
of coercive police practices. 50 For example, in Chambers v. Florida, the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See infra Part IV (providing recommendations for these claims).
See infra Part II (discussing the developments leading to Mirandaand its holding).
See infra Part III (discussing how post-Warren Courts have handled Miranda).
See infra Part IV (providing recommendations for using Miranda moving forward).
See generally Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
See, e.g., Vitiello, supra note 4.
Brown, 297 U.S. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 281-82, 285.
See generally Powellv. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Michael J. Klarman, The Racial

OriginsofModern CriminalProcedure,99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 50-52 (2000).

47. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
48. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) (reversing a conviction where a police officer
admitted slapping the accused). But see Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 403-04 (1958) (affirming the
conviction of accused lassoed by men accompanying the sheriff); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 198
(1952) (affirming conviction of accused slapped by a civilian in the presence of the police).
49. As the Court suggested in Spano, law enforcement agents became more sophisticated in
techniques that they used to secure confessions. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959).
50. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 147 (1944); see also Spano, 360 U.S. at 321
("But as law enforcement officers become more responsible, and the methods used to extract confessions
more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional protections does not cease. It only becomes
more difficult because of the more delicate judgments to be made.").
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Court dealt with a case where violence was not used.5' Instead, the police
conducted questioning of the suspects over several days, often during the
night, and only with occasional breaks for food and rest. 52 But like Brown,
Chambers involved young African-American defendants sentenced to
death. 53 After its independent review of the record, a unanimous Court found
that the police conduct violated the defendants' due process rights.54 Similar
cases followed. 5
Often, the Court dealt with cases arising out of the South and involving
African-American defendants. 56 Often, the Court reviewed cases where the
defendant faced the death penalty.57 During the thirty years between Brown
and Miranda, the Court decided thirty-five cases in which it had to resolve
whether a confession was voluntary. 58 Unlike Brown, police did not engage
in violence. "Instead, police used a host of other techniques, including: the
'third degree,' use of trickery, good-cop-bad-cop interrogations, threats, and
other devices to erode a suspect's confidence even in one's own
innocence." 59 But given the range of possible police activities, what fact or
facts were controlling absent police violence or threat of violence?
Spano v. New York demonstrates the problem. As I summarized that
case elsewhere:
There, a young, foreign-born man with no history of criminal activity or
familiarity with the police shot a much larger man who was also a former
professional boxer. The victim took money from the defendant, and when
the defendant confronted him, the victim knocked him down and kicked
him in the head repeatedly. Shortly thereafter, the defendant returned to the
area, now with a firearm, and shot the victim to death.
The police were able to secure a confession from the defendant only
after several hours of interrogation and after using a friend of the
defendant's to cajole him into confession. Gaspar Bruno, the defendant's
close personal friend and a 'fledgling police officer,' received a call from
the defendant explaining the circumstances of the killing. The police
eventually used Bruno to get him to confess. The police were able to get the
defendant to confess to facts that, despite a possible reduction of his crime

51. See generally Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
52. See id at 230-31.
53. See id at 235.
54. See id at 241.
55. See generally Spano, 360 U.S. at 315; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Lisenbav. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 57 (1932); Massiahv. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
56. See Herman, supra note 7, at 747.
57. See id at 747-48.
58. See id at 749.
59. Vitiello, supranote 4, at 67.

2021]
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to voluntary manslaughter, allowed the state to secure a first-degree murder
conviction and the imposition of the death penalty. 60

In concluding Spano's confession was involuntary, the Court recited a dozen
facts relevant to its conclusion. 6 1 One commentator summed up cases like
Spano by observing that no single fact was controlling, but almost everything
was relevant to the conclusion. 62
The Court's voluntariness caselaw could provide little guidance to lower
courts. 63 Apart from a few obvious cases like Brown, voluntariness
determinations were ad hoc. 64 Combined with that, the Court gave little
deference to lower court findings in such cases. 65 Especially because of the
racial implications of so many of the cases and because of the Court's
increasing discomfort with the death penalty, the Court had to intervene
often. 66 That posed difficulties for a court with a limited docket. 67
Some of the problems with the Court's caselaw derived from
uncertainty about "voluntariness" generally. 68 The concept is distinct from
the substantive Criminal Law actus reus requirement: there, if the actor wills
his conduct, he has acted voluntarily.69 Brown and his codefendants

60. Id. at 68.
61. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1959).
62. See Herman, supra note 7, at 745. Lawrence Herman described the matter well:
It violates due process of law for the prosecution in a criminal case to use the defendant's
involuntary confession against him. Whether a confession is involuntary must be determined
by considering the totality of the circumstances-the characteristics of the defendant and the
environment and techniques of interrogation. Under the 'totality of the circumstances'
approach, virtually everything is relevant and nothing is determinative. If you place a premium
on clarity, this is not a good sign . . .. The point is that the [Miranda] dissenters in 1966 and
the Attorney General in 1985 were simply wrong in their claim that we got along well with the
law that antedated Miranda.
Id. at 745, 755 (footnotes omitted).
63. See id. at 744.
64. See Spano, 360 U.S. at 315; see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237-39 (1941)
(dealing with a fact-laden voluntariness case).
65. While the Court had to defer to findings of historical facts, the Court reviewed de novo whether
a confession was voluntary. See Vitiello, supra note 4, at 69 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
286-87 (1936)).
66. See id. at 64 (citing Herman, supra note 7, at 747).
67. On average, the Supreme Court hears only 100-150 of the more than 7,000 cases petitioned for
certiorari eachyear and cannot hope to resolve many of the difficult confession cases eachyear; see About
the Supreme Court, U.S. CTS. , https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resourc

es/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/about (lastvisited Sept. 8, 2021). See also Yale Kamisar,
On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It-And What
Happenedto It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 168 (2007) ("In the thirty years precedingMiranda,two-thirds
of all the state confession cases the Supreme Court chose to review were death penalty cases. Even then,
only one condemned person out of four had his case reviewed by the highest court in the land and only
one out of eight obtained a reversal.").
68. See Herman, supra note 7, at 749.
69.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.01

(AM. L. INST. 1962).
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consciously decided to speak to stop the whipping.70 But one recoils at the
police conduct there, inviting the question: Why is the conduct so intolerable?
Cases like Brown demonstrate a concern that an offender might confess
falsely.7 ' Thus, as the Court observed in Brown, little evidence implicated the
defendants other than their confessions. 72 Faced with continued beating, the
defendants may well have said anything necessary to stop the process.
Indeed, John Wigmore, one of the nation's leading evidence scholars, argued
that the appropriate test was whether the inducements were calculated to
secure a confession without regard to its truthfulness.73
In cases decided in the 1940s, such as Ashcraft v. Tennessee, justices
compared "certain foreign nations" to the United States.74 Unlike those
foreign powers, the United States has in place a constitution that protects
against coerced confessions. 75 That suggests civilized societies must follow
some basic restraints.
At other times, the Court seemed more concerned about the offender's
state of mind than with police practices. 76 In Lisenba v. California, for
example, the Court noted due process violations during an extended period
of interrogation.77 It acknowledged that in an initial interrogation, even a
police officer admitted slapping the defendant. 7 8 Nonetheless, the Court
upheld the defendant's conviction and death penalty, largely because when
the defendant confessed, "[h]e exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an
acumen throughout his questioning."7 9 Despite police misconduct, a suspect
who retained freedom of action did not act involuntarily. 80
One can easily imagine-and at times the Court decided cases-where
these values are in conflict. 81 What if a defendant confesses because private
citizens believe that he has committed a crime and beat him? Do cases like
70.

See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-83 (1936).

71. Id. at 279; see also Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences and Implications,
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 37, 332-43 (2009); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions:Risk
Factorsand Recommendations, 34 L. HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010); The Confessions, FRONTLINE, https://www.

pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-confessions/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2021) (acknowledging concerns of
false confessions). Many police follow methods advocated in the infamous Inbau-Reid Manual, criticized
in Miranda. George C. Thomas III, RegulatingPolice DeceptionDuring Interrogation,39 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 1293, 1300 (2007). Those techniques included isolating defendants, using the good-cop-bad-cop
technique, and using various forms of trickery. Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 109, 154-59 (1998). Critics have identified cases in which such techniques lead to innocent suspects
confessing to crimes that they did not commit. See JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., S. MEDWED, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATING CRIME 279-30 (7th ed. 2020).
72. Brown, 297 U.S. at 279.
73. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 159, § 833 (2d ed. 1923).
74. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
75. Id.
76. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 239-41 (1941).
77. Id.

78.
79.

Id. at 230.
Id. at 241.

80.

Id.

81.

See generally Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 219; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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Brown turn on state action? Or do they turn on the fear of unreliability? 2 If
state action is required, what if the state actor is not at fault in causing the
defendant to confess? For example, what if a doctor acting on behalf of the
state provides a jailed offender with pain medication that leads to him
confessing?"3
Three problems surface when one examines this history: first, the
concerns underlying the Court's voluntariness caselaw presented an
"analytical stew." 84 That is, the Court varied its explanation of their primary
concerns for the limitation on police power. 85 Beyond that, the Court's test
seemed ill-suited in various ways. The Court's test was hardly a test at all,
but an ad hoc assessment of an almost infinite number of variables. 86 Finally,
the Court sought to intervene to overcome obvious racial injustice.87 The
defendants in the Court's voluntariness caselaw were most often AfricanAmerican, indigent, or both.88 By contrast, more affluent defendants, able to
afford counsel, had an advantage when they faced police interrogation:
counsel would have advised them to refuse to speak or to insist on consulting
with counsel before responding to certain lines of questioning. 89
Even before Miranda,the Court explored other ways to protect suspects
in the interrogation setting. 90 Using its advisory powers over the federal
system, the Court held that a suspect had to be taken before a magistrate
without undue delay, thereby depriving police the chance to engage in
extensive interrogation of a suspect. 91 In cases arising out of state courts, the
Supreme Court seemed ready to move the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
82. If the Court's concern in Brown was with the reliability of a suspect who had a confession beaten
out of him, why should it matter that a private citizen, not a state actor, beat the suspect? Cf Hector (A
Slave) v. State, 2 Mo. 166 (1829) (noting that private citizens beat suspect until he confessed to burglary).
83. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1954); Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293, 299
(1963).
84.

See DRESSLER ET AL., supranote 71, at 589.

85. See Blackbum v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1966) (noting "a complex of values underlies the
stricture against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms
involuntary.").

86.

Id.; see also supra Part II (discussing Spano and the Court's failure to provide a structured test

for lower courts).

87. See supra Part II (discussing the road to Miranda as a response to racial injustice); see also Yale
Kamisar, EqualJustice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in POLICE
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 27 (1980) (discussing a history of support for the Court's involuntary

confession rule).
88. See id. (discussing cases arising out of the South and involving indigent African-American
defendants).
89. See Kamisar, supra note 87; see also DRESSLER ET AL., supra note 71, at 612 (discussing
Kamisar's view that respect for the individual and securing equal treatment in law enforcement require
the state to make counsel available to all suspects who face police interrogation and to warn them that
they need not answer).
90. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322, 341 (1943) (setting aside convictions as a
result of officers' failure to maintain standards of procedure and evidence); Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449, 454-55 (1957) (finding that defendant was not promptly arraigned as required by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure).
91. Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455.

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

68

[Vol. 54:59

to the interrogation setting. 92 Thus in Spano, four concurring justices urged
just that approach. 93 There, the defendant was formally charged and, as such,
had a clear right to counsel in any critical stage of the proceedings. 94 Implicit
was the idea that custodial interrogation was just such a setting. 95 Then, in
Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court seemed to hold just that: once the police have
focused on a suspect, the suspect has the right to counsel when the police
interrogate the suspect. 96
EnterMiranda.Instead of broadening its holding in Escobedo, the Court
found that the right implicated in custodial settings was the Fifth Amendment
right to be free from being compelled as a witness against oneself.97 Scholars,
including Arnold Loewy, have explored why grounding its holding in the
Fifth, not the Sixth, Amendment made a difference-one that would allow
Miranda's erosion. 98 In defense of the Court, it relied on nineteenth century
precedent that held the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled
testimony extended to the custodial interrogation setting. 99 Miranda did
much more than find that a suspect in custody might be compelled to be a
witness against himself.0 0
Miranda established a set of procedural protections-the set of famous
warnings police must provide a suspect before engaging in custodial
interrogation.' 0 ' Chief Justice Warren's opinion, for the deeply divided
Court, reads like a series of legislative rules.IO2 Those rules are, of course, the
famous Miranda warnings. 0 3 Seldom has the Court created such a specific
set of rules in general, let alone for police to follow.10 4 But the Chief Justice's
goals were readily visible.
Unlike opinions in the voluntariness cases, the Chief Justice barely
mentioned the facts of the Miranda case or companion cases before the
Court.1 05 The answer lies in the discussion above: The hope was to get the
Court out of the business of deciding cases on an ad hoc basis. 06 Indeed, the
92.

See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324-27 (Douglas & Stewart, JJ., concurring).

93.
94.

Id.
Id.

95. Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring).
96. See generallyEscobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). One commentator has called Escobedo
a schizoid opinion. See generally Loewy, supra note 5. Much of its discussion focused broadly on the
suspect's need for Sixth Amendment counsel in the interrogation setting, but then, in announcing its
holding, the Court focused closely on the specifics of the case. See id. at 430.
97. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
98. See Loewy, supra note 5, at 435-37; see also Loewy, supra note 17, at 147, 152.
99. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 550-51 (1897).
100.

See generallyMiranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

101.
102.

Id. at 344-45.
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988).

103.

See, e.g., id.

104.
105.
106.
resulting

See Caplan, supra note 1, at 1427-35.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491.
Id. at 524; see also supra Part II (discussing the fact-laden cases decided before Miranda,
in ad hoc determinations).
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Court was clear: even if the state could show that a suspect knew his rights,
the state could not argue on an ad hoc basis that the defendant's statement
was admissible.1 07 Whether police gave the Miranda warnings was a
"clearcut fact," not subject to case-by-case adjudication.1 08
Not only were warnings needed to avoid ad hoc determinations, but the
warnings were also designed to dissipate the inherently coercive environment
in the police dominated custodial setting.1 09 Implicitly, the suspect would be
assured that she could act freely in choosing not to speak." 0 Also implicit in
the warnings was the Court's concern about equality: the court would make
court-appointed counsel available if the suspect could not afford counsel."'
I suspect Miranda would have faced a backlash under any
circumstances. But the Court left itself open to criticism, as I described in an
earlier article:
Along the way, the Miranda Court made two statements that would give
fuel to its critics: the first was an acknowledgement that under its traditional
voluntariness case law, at least some of the confessions before the Court
would not have been excluded at trial. In addition, apparently at Justice
Brennan's suggestion, the Chief Justice included a suggestion that Congress
or state legislatures might come up with alternative remedies to the Court's
warnings. Given the Court's limited authority over state court judgments,
critics argued that the Court lacked constitutional authority to impose
warnings because states did not have to follow them. But that is part of the
post-Mirandastory."1 2

As one commentator observed, language like this was a "self-inflicted
wound.""1 3 The next section picks up with the depth of that wound.
III. ON THE ROAD TO A NEAR-DEATH EXPERIENCE AND BEYOND

The late 1960s saw increased crime rates and riots in American cities." 4
An early victims' rights organization targeted cases like Miranda and other
Warren Court decisions that "mollycoddled" criminals as part of the cause of
increased violence." 5 Avowed segregationist George Wallace made openly

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Kamisar, supra note 87.
Vitiello, supranote 4, at 70 (footnotes omitted).

113.
114.
COURT
BAKER,

See GRAHAM, supra note 24.
See id. at 86-101, 299; see also MICHAEL J. GRAETz & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER
AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 12-13 (2016); MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 47-51;
supra note 25, at 364-65.
115. Paul G. Ulrich, What Happenedto Miranda: A Decisionand Its Consequences, 72 J. MO. BAR.

204, 204 (2016).
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racist appeals to American voters." 6 Richard Nixon ran a less overtly racist
campaign, instead using the "dog whistle" promise to bring "law and order"
back to the streets." 7 Hubert Humphrey did little to defend the Court."'
Nixon's attack on the Court helped him win the presidency.11 9 In part,
because of parting-President Lyndon Johnson's political blunder, Nixon
made four appointments to the Court between 1969 and 1971.120 Along with
some of Miranda's dissenters, the newly appointed members of the Court
would begin eroding Mirandaalmost immediately.121
As described in the previous section, the Chief Justice made two
statements in Mirandathat critics focused upon to challenge its legitimacy.1 2 2
First, the underlying constitutional right involved was the right to be free
from being compelled to be a witness against oneself'1 23 But, as the Court
observed, under its prior caselaw the confessions in some cases before the
Court would have been admissible.1 24 That, along with the statement that
Congress or the states could come up with alternatives to Mirandaprocedures
gave traction to its critics: Miranda was not grounded in the Constitution. 125
If not, then the Court had no power to enforce its protections against the

states.126
As early as 1971, the Court started the process ofMiranda's erosion.12 7
In Harris v. New York, new-Chief Justice Burger argued that much of
116. See MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 42-43 (In Wallace's standard stump speech, "he linked the
rise in crime to the Court by telling those assembled, 'If you walk out of this hotel tonight and someone
knocks you on the head, he'll be out of jail before you're out of the hospital, and on Monday morning
they'll try the policeman instead of the criminal."'); id. at 42 ("That's right, we [are] gonna have a police
state for folks who burn the cities down. They aren't gonna bum any more cities."); id. at 46 (Regarding
the Court's desegregation of public schools, "Wallace told a group of voters in Toledo, Ohio, that if he
became president 'not a single penny of federal tax money is going to be used to send a little child any
place you don't want him."').
117. BAKER, supra note 25, at 224 (During his speech accepting the Republican Presidential
nomination, Nixon promised voters "that 'the wave of crime is not going to be the wave of the future in
the United States of America,' that the restoration of law and order would be a linchpin of his
administration."); see also MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 46-47 (examining the differences between
Wallace and Nixon's criticisms of the Supreme Court); id. at 57 ("As part of his electoral strategy in the
1968 campaign, Nixon often spoke out against the Warren Court.").
118.

DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 12, at 584.

119.

Vitiello, supranote 2, at 626.

120.

SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., supra note 27; see also, e.g., Massaro, supra note 26, at 621

(evaluating ways in which "it was poor presidential management rather than ideology that was the primary
factor leading to the Senate's refusal to confirm Abe Fortas."); MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 17-36
(arguing that Johnson's selection of Fortas, "a case of gross political malpractice," tipped the scales in
favor of Richard Nixon securing the Republican Party's 1968 Presidential nomination, thereafter the
general election and the ability to appoint Justices).
121. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (demonstrating shifts in the application of Miranda).
122. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting significant criticisms of Miranda that gained
popularity).
123. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying purpose of Miranda).
124. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-80 (1966).
125. Id. at 490.
126. Dripps, supra note 23, at 19.
127. See generally Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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Miranda was dicta.1 28 Three years later, the Court began referring to those
warnings as prophylactic protections, not themselves required by the
Constitution.1 2 9 A few years later, the Court would make a sharp distinction
between a "mere" Mirandaviolation and a violation of the core right to be
free from being compelled to be a witness against oneself.1 30
The argument that Miranda was not rooted in the Constitution invited
challenges over time.131 Almost certainly, the Court was ready to overrule
Miranda when it granted certiorari in Brewer v. Williams.1 32 There, a young
child was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered at a YMCA.1 33 The
events took place on Christmas Eve.1 34 The defendant's conviction was
affirmed in the state courts. 13 But the federal district court found that the
detective's famous "Christian burial speech" was a violation of Miranda.136
The court also found that the speech violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel because the detective deliberately elicited the
incriminating response after formal proceedings commenced, and the
defendant's statement was involuntary.1 37 The court of appeals found the
police conduct violated Miranda and the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.1 38 A divided Court did not reach the Miranda issues and grounded
its affirmance on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.139
What better case to use to overrule Miranda? The facts were so brutal
that even members of the majority seemed almost apologetic in upholding
the lower courts.140 As I ask my students, why would a Justice in the majority
vote to grant review given that the defendant won in the courts below? The
answer is obvious: the dissenters, and perhaps Justice Stewart, who wrote an

128. Id. at 224, 226.
129. Michiganv. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
130. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1979).
131. See generally Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
132. Id. at 389-90.
133. Id. at 390-93.
134. Id. at 393.
135. Id. at 400.
136. Id. at 402-03.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 403.
139. Id. at 397-98, 407; id. at 407 (Marshall, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 407 ("The crime of which Williams was convicted was senseless and brutal, calling for
swift and energetic action by the police to apprehend the perpetrator and gather evidence with which he
could be convicted. No mission of law enforcement officials is more important. Yet '[d]isinterested zeal
for the public good does not assure either wisdom or right in the methods it pursues.' Although we do not
lightly affirm the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in this case, so clear a violation of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments as here occurred cannot be condoned. The pressures on state executive and
judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great, especially when the crime
is murder and the victim a small child. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes
imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all.") (citation omitted).
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earlier important Sixth Amendment right to counsel case but was also a
Miranda dissenter, may have done so to review Miranda. 141
While the Court narrowly avoided overruling Miranda, it continued the
ongoing process of cabining Mirandaprotections.1 42 In the 1980s, the Court
found that officers may interrogate a suspect in custody without Miranda
warnings if warranted by the need to protect the public.1 43 The Fifth
Amendment right to be free from compelled testimony and the voluntariness
requirement do not allow for such an exception.1 44 The answer: because
Miranda is merely prophylactic, the Court should extend it only if, on
balance, extension outweighs competing values.1 4 5 Similarly, when the police
fail to give a suspect Mirandawarnings and take a statement, the police may
subsequently give the warnings and take a statement; because Miranda is
merely a prophylactic rule, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not
apply.1 46
In 1968, even before Nixon won the presidency, Congress took Miranda
at its word, sort of. The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act included a
provision that seemed to overrule Miranda.147 In effect, the act reinstituted
the voluntariness standards that Miranda attempted to circumvent.1 48 Given
the provision's questionable constitutionality, the Department of Justice
avoided urging its application.1 49 Finally, in the 1990s, in large part at the
influence of Professor Paul Cassell, a Mirandacritic, the government finally
implored the Court to apply @ 3501 of the 1968 law. 5 0

141. See Massiahv. United States, 377 U.S. 207, 211-13 (1964) (holding that defendant's Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights were violated by use in evidence against him of incriminating statements which
he made to co-defendant after their indictment and their release on bail and in absence of defendant's
retained counsel and which were overheard on radio by government agent without defendant's knowledge
that co-defendant had decided to cooperate with government and had permitted agent to install radio
transmitter under front seat of co-defendant's automobile); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504-26
(1966) (Harlan & Steward, JJ., dissenting); id. at 526-45 (White & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
142. See Vitiello, supra note 4, at 72-75.
143. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657-58 (1984).
144. Id. at 653-55.
145. Id. at 657.
146. See generally Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
147. See 34 U.S.C. § 10101; 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)-(b); see also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
37 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2188.
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501; see also Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress Overrule Miranda?, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 883, 884-85 (2000) ("Section 3501 makes the pre-Escobedo, pre-Miranda 'due
process'-totality of the circumstances'-voluntariness' rules the sole test for the admissibility of
confessions in federal prosecutions").
149. Section 3501 was never enforced by the Justice Department. Pierre Thomas, Justice Seeks to
Overturn Recent MirandaRuling, CNN (Mar. 10, 1999), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/19
99/03/10/miranda/.
150. Paul Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the OverhaulingofMiranda,
85 IOwA L. REV. 175, 225 (1999).

2021]

MIRANDA

ISDEAD: LONG LIVE MIRANDA

73

Not without irony, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for seven
justices: Mirandawas constitutional."' The irony, of course, was that Nixon
appointed Rehnquist as one of his "Law and Order" Justices, in part with an
eye to overruling Miranda.1 2 Finding an explanation for why the Chief
Justice could write his lukewarm endorsement ofMiranda is not hard to find:
Police learned to deal with its requirements, confessions did not dry up, and
after Miranda's near-death experience in Brewer v. Williams, the Court
continued to cabin the decision.' 53
The Court has refused to expand Miranda in virtually every
post-Mirandaarea save one: when a suspect requests counsel in the custodial
setting."' Elsewhere, however, Mirandahas nearly vanished."' A review of
all those cases is beyond the scope of this Article. One example, however,
demonstrates the trend.1 56
Miranda was premised on a suspect's ability to invoke the right to
silence or counsel.15 7 The Miranda Court envisioned a suspect leveling the
playing field by invoking silence or the right to counsel to counteract the
inherent compulsion in the custodial setting.1 58 But, as Justice White argued
in dissent, police could get a suspect to waive her rights in that coercive
setting.1 59 The majority insisted, however, the state would carry a heavy
burden of demonstrating waiver.1 60 While it rejected the need for any
particular form of a waiver, it insisted a waiver would not be lightly inferred,
and a statement taken after the warnings, without more, would be insufficient
evidence of a voluntary waiver.161
151. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 462-65 (2000) (holding that Miranda's warningbased approach to determining admissibility of the statement made by the accused during custodial
interrogation was constitutionally based and could not be in effect overruled by legislative act).
152. See Kamisar, supra note 30, at 1294-95.
153. See Vitiello, supra note 4, at 73; see also Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court's Love-Hate
Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 376 (2011); e.g., Berghuis v.

Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 387-91 (2010); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 124-30 (2010); Florida v.
Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 64 (2010).
154. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
155.

See generally Weisselberg, supra note 34.

156. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 374-75 (2010).
157. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (holding when at any point during an
interrogation the accused seeks affirmatively or impliedly to invoke his rights to silence or counsel,
interrogation must be forgone or postponed).
158. See id. at 474 ("Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation
operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been
once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and
to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he
indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.").
159. Id. at 535-37 (White, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 475.
161. Id. at 444-45, 470, 475 ("An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement
and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver
will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the
fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.").
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Early in the Burger Court, the Court held that the burden of proving
waiver was by a preponderance of the evidence, not by some heightened
burden of proof. 6 2 Even more revealing, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the
Court's original insistence that proof of a waiver would be difficult seemed
nowhere in evidence.1 63
In Thompkins, police gave the suspect a form including the Miranda
rights.1 64 The police also had the suspect read the rights to them to assure he
could understand the warnings.1 65 He read the warnings but refused to sign a
form that would have acknowledged he understood his rights.1 66
Without the suspect making any affirmative statement waiving his
rights, the police began questioning him about his involvement in a
murder.1 67 Over about three hours, the suspect did not invoke his right to
remain silent, instead simply remaining mostly silent.1 68 Almost three hours
after the interrogation began, the suspect admitted his involvement in the
murder.1 69
The Court upheld the use of the defendant's confession. 7 0 The Court
resolved two interwoven issues.' 7 ' First, if a suspect wants to invoke his right
to silence, he must do so unequivocally. 7 2 Second, on the facts of the case,
the Court found that the defendant waived his rights. 13
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor questioned the sense of a rule that requires
a person wanting to remain silent to speak.
Apart from that question, what
about the waiver in Thompkins? What did the state prove, and did it meet any
kind of heavy burden? This looks like little more than a situation where police
gave the suspect his warnings, followed by a confession. 7 5 Beyond a
statement (contested in the record) that the suspect said he understood his
warnings, the record seems silent on when and how the waiver took place.17 6
We have come a long way since Miranda.
'4

'7

162. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986); see also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 489 (1972) (reiterating that the prosecution must prove that a confession was voluntary by a
preponderance of the evidence).
163. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 383 (2010).
164. Id. at 374-75.
165. Id. at 375.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 375-76.
168. Id. at 375.
169. Id. at 376.
170. Id. at 391.
171. Id. at 382, 385.
172. Id. at 382.
173. Id. at 385.
174. Id. at 391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
175. See id at 399.
176. See id at 374-76.
177. Miranda said: "a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after
warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained." Miranda v.
United States, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); see also id. at 470 ("No effective waiver ... can be recognized
unless specifically made after the [Miranda] warnings ... have been given."). In addition, the Miranda
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Early on, Miranda had many conservative critics. 78 Over time, largely
because it has been so badly eroded, many scholars from across the political
spectrum have abandoned belief that Miranda works. 7 9 As now applied,
Mirandadoes not do much to address the concerns that led to its adoption.'80
As developed below, however, as Miranda shrank, lawyers realized that
voluntariness remains an alternative argument against the use of some
confessions.18' But, the courts may be back to the beginning, without much
82
more clarity than existed pre-Miranda.1
IV. BACK TO THE BEGINNING?

Lawyers trained in the late 1960s did not learn much about the Supreme
Court's voluntariness caselaw.1 83 Leading Criminal Procedure casebooks
typically excluded such material or mentioned it in passing.18 4 As the Court
began cabining Miranda, voluntariness claims reemerged.1 85 Indeed, these
claims were possible even when Miranda had strength.1 86
Recognizing the continued vitality of voluntariness is important. We can
only guess at how the Warren Court, had membership on the Court not
changed so quickly, would have implemented Miranda. But, as the
post-Warren Courts have narrowed Miranda, Miranda protects the wrong
suspects. One commentator has argued persuasively that Miranda "protect[s]
noncooperation and cover-up by the most knowledgeable, cunning, and
steely criminals, while providing only minimal safeguards for those who are
Court stated that "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel." Id. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)).
178. See Vitiello, supra note 4, at 71-72.
179. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 445 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also A
Thirty-Year Perspective, supra note 21, at 1062-63 (arguing that existing data does not answer questions
of whether Miranda hinders law enforcement); A Review ofFifty Years, supra note 21, at 848 (concluding
restraints placed on law enforcement by Miranda have made law enforcement less effective); Alschuler,
supra note 21, at 2629-30 (questioning the meaning of Miranda); Loewy, supra note 4, at 434-35
(considering issues of coerced confessions); see infra Part IV (discussing post-Miranda case law).
180. For example, the Miranda Court's concern about equality seems to have gone by the wayside.
See generally George C. Thomas III, Miranda'sIllusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room,
81 TEx. L. REV. 91 (2003). As some critics point out, few of the suspects most in need of Miranda
protection invoke those protections. See Alschuler, supra note 21.
181. See infra Part IV (discussing post-Miranda caselaw).
182. See infra Part IV (discussing post-Miranda caselaw and the issues affecting lower courts).
183. That was my experience as a law student in the early 1970s, when I took Criminal Procedure as
a 1L at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
184. See Schulhofer, supra note 31, at 878 n.57 (discussing the voluntariness test as part of the
historical background of Miranda).
185. One can imagine a case in which a suspect waived her Miranda rights, only then to be subjected
to coercive police practices that violated the Court's voluntariness standard. See id. at 878 n.58.
186. See generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). Despite that, many courts ignored
that reality. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004). As Justice Souter stated in Seibert,
"giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility . .. and
litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver." Id.
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uneducated, unintelligent, or easily coerced."1 87 Despite its flaws, the Court's
voluntariness caselaw did a better job of protecting suspects most in need of
court-intervention. 8 8

This section discusses the implications of the reemergence of
voluntariness. At the core of the discussion is this question: are the courts
merely back at the beginning or can courts make the test work more
effectively than in the past? This section also explores why the voluntariness
test does a better job protecting the "right" suspects. It then considers whether
anything has changed since Miranda or whether the voluntariness test is still
as unworkable as the Court seemed to believe when it decided Miranda.
Finally, it considers how the Court might evolve its voluntariness standard to
create clearer rules governing confessions.
So, who was supposed to benefit from Miranda?As developed above,
the Court was concerned about equal justice, especially for minority
defendants and other defendants unable to deal with inherent coercion present
in the custodial setting.' 89 Inexperienced suspects or suspects with various
emotional or other problems could easily be pressured to give up their rights
in such a setting.' 90 The Miranda Court seemed to envision the warnings as
giving such suspects assurance they could, and probably should, invoke their
rights.' 9' But as evidenced by the evolving caselaw, Miranda does a poor job
at helping those most in need of protection.
Think about the invocation of one's rights in the custodial setting.
Remember that Miranda asserted the state would carry a heavy burden in
demonstrating a valid waiver. 92 But when the Court has considered how a
suspect invokes her Miranda rights, it has placed a heavy burden on the
suspect to do so unequivocally.1 93 Thus, in Davis v. United States, the Court
found that the suspect's statement, "[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer," was
not sufficient to invoke the right to counsel or even to require any kind of
follow-up questioning because the suspect's potential invocation of the right
to counsel was ambiguous. 194 The Davis Court created a bright line rule, but
one that disfavors the suspect.195

187.

Scott W. Howe, Moving Beyond Miranda: Concessionsfor Confessions, 110 NW. U.. L. REV.

905, 906 (2016).
188. For example, in Spano, the Court pointed to the defendant's mental problems, youth, and
inexperience with the criminal justice system as relevant to its finding that his confession was involuntary.
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-22 (1959). As Justice Souter suggested in Seibert, focusing only
on Miranda might lead to a different conclusion: if a suspect has received his Miranda warnings, his
statement will be admissible if his waiver was voluntary. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608-614. In such a case, the
suspect's individual traits have less importance than in the voluntariness multifactored test. Id.
189. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
194. Id. at 462.
195. Id. at 461-62 (Ruling that under Edwards v. Arizona, police are only required to stop a custodial
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As discussed above, the Court went further in Thompkins. 96 There, it
held that a suspect must unequivocally invoke the right to remain silent.1 97
Cases like Davis and Thompkins invite consideration of who is most
likely to make an unequivocal invocation of their rights.1 98 Professor Janet
Ainsworth identified different speech patterns among men and women.199
She opined sociological research show "men tend to use direct and assertive
language, whereas women more often adopt indirect and deferential speech
patterns." 20 0 Even more important, given men are more likely to enter the
criminal justice system as suspects than women, she also observed that the
same phenomenon exists with marginalized groups.2 oi Powerless individuals
are less likely than those with power to speak without ambiguity. 20 2
We can only guess whether the Warren Court would have bolstered
Miranda in areas where the post-Warren Courts have eroded it. Certainly, as
administered, Miranda does not help the group most likely in need of
protection against coercion. As cited above, that has led scholars like
Professor Scott Howe to conclude that Miranda protects only "the most
knowledgeable, cunning, and steely criminals, while providing only minimal
safeguards for those who are uneducated, unintelligent, or easily coerced." 2 03
The Court's voluntariness caselaw does a much better job at protecting
the suspects most in need of protection. Compare cases like Lisenba and
Spano.204 According to the Court, Lisenba
Exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his
questioning, and at his trial, which negatives the view that he had so lost his
freedom of action that the statements made were not his but were the result
of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to

answer. 205
Thus, Lisenba's relative sophistication led to the use of his confession. 2 06

interrogation if the suspect has unambiguously requested an attorney).
196. See generally Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
197. See id. at 380-82 (holding that where a defendant does not invoke his right to remain silent after
fully understanding his Miranda rights, he implicitly waives his Miranda rights by making a voluntary
statement to police).
198. See generally id.; Davis, 512 U.S. at 452.
199. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, In a DifferentRegister: The PragmaticsofPowerlessnessin Police
Interrogation,103 YALE L.J. 259, 259 (1993).

200.

Id. at 262.

201.
202.

Id. at 263.
Id. at 261-62.

203.
204.

Howe, supra note 187, at 907.
See generally Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,

241 (1959).

205.
206.

Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 241.
See id.
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Compare the Court's view of Spano. 207 There, the Court focused on the
suspect's youth, lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system, and
emotional instability as relevant to its finding that the suspect's confession
was involuntary.20 s
Would Lisenba or Spano be more likely to invoke Miranda rights
unequivocally? The sociological research suggests that Lisenba would be
more likely to do so. 2 09 Of course, he would seem far less in need of help in
negotiating the coercive police-dominated environment. That certainly
suggests the voluntariness test was better suited to the task than was Miranda.
This recognition goes only so far in redeeming the Court's voluntariness
caselaw. As discussed above, the test was hardly a test but an almost infinite
variety of factors relevant to a court's conclusion.21 o Compounding the
imprecision of the Court's tests was its "analytical stew." 211 Thus, the Court
seemed to be advancing different, and at times competing, values in its
caselaw.
Because voluntariness is now important again, one needs to ask whether
anything has changed since the Court tried to address these problems. The
answer is yes and no.
Initially, what about the "analytical stew" or, as the Court described it,
"a complex of values" that explain its voluntariness test? 212 Early cases like
Brown seemed premised on the concern about reliability. 213 A suspect who is
beaten may be willing to testify to whatever his torturer wants him to say to
stop the pain.2 14 Since the early cases, however, the Court has made clear that
its voluntariness test is triggered only if a defendant is complaining about
state action.21 s Thus, as in Colorado v. Connelly, a delusional person who
confesses because God told him to do so cannot claim that his statement was
involuntary. 2 1 6 His recourse, if any, is to argue under the jurisdiction's
evidence rules that the statement is inadmissible. 2 1 7
Connelly clarified the "analytical stew" only slightly. Unanswered by
Connelly is whether state action is enough or whether the state actor must act

207.

See Spano, 350 U.S. at 321-23.

208.

See id.

209. See, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 199, at 286.
210. See supra Part II (discussing the Court's voluntariness test and asserting it was no test at all, but
an ad hoc determination rendering inconsistent results).
211. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 12, at 603.
212. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1966).
213. See generally Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
214. Id. at 282.
215. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986).
216. Id. at 159.
217. Id. at 167 ("We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state
laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A statement
rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter
to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum.").
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with some level of culpability. 218 Imagine, for example, that a doctor acting
on behalf of the police inadvertently gives a suspect medication that acts as
a truth serum. 2 1 9 Does that render a confession involuntary? The state actor
may have been without blame. 220 The suspect's statement may be reliable,
depending on the drug administered. 221 However, the suspect would not be
acting with mental freedom.222
The Court still seems intent on advancing competing values with its
test.223 One can imagine other examples like the previous one where the
various values protected by the Court's voluntariness test are at odds with
one another. For example, what about cases in which police act improperly,
perhaps even intentionally, but the conduct does not seem to deprive the
suspect of his mental freedom? 224 Connelly seemed to make state action a
necessary condition but did not address whether improper police conduct
might be a sufficient condition.22 5
Beyond the reality that the Court's case law seems to advance
competing values, what about the even more significant problem Miranda
sought to address: can the Court create clarity so its test does not turn on
endless factors?
To get at the previous question, consider taping of confessions. 2 26 About
half of the states require taping of confessions, at least in some cases. 22 7
Indeed, many commentators have argued that taping is a better remedy than
Miranda.228 This includes commentators across the political spectrum. 229 The
late-Dean Gerald Caplan urged taping, along with other remedies, as a better
alternative to warnings in his widely cited Article critical of Miranda.2 30
More recently, Professor Chris Slobogin, among others, has urged taping as

218. Id. at 165.
219. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 298 (1963) (describing how medication was administered
by a physician acting on behalf of the police and that neither the physician nor the police realized that the
medication would act as a "truth serum").
220.

Id. at 308; see also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165.

221. Cf, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 237 (1936) (deciding that a confession procured by
coercion is unconstitutional).
222. Contra Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941) (deciding that the suspect made the
statement with his own freedom).
223. See generally Brown, 297 U.S. at 278; Connelly, 479 U.S. at 157; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86 (1923); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
224. Imagine a case in which police falsely tell the suspect that he will be given favorable treatment
if he confesses, but the suspect is fully aware the police are lying.
225.
226.

See generally Connelly, 479 U.S. at 157.
False Confessions & Recording of Custodial Interrogations, INNOCENCE

PROJECT,

https://www.innocenceproject.org/false-confessions-recording-interrogations/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 32, at 316-18; see also Caplan, supra note 1, at 1475.
229. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Casts:An EmpiricalReassessment, 90 Nw. U.. L.
REV. 286, 489-92 (1996); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: SafeguardsAgainst
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R. C.L. L. REv. 105, 153-55 (1997).

230.

See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 1, at 1475.
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an effective method for reviewing voluntariness claims. 23 ' Indeed, Professor
Slobogin has argued that a litigant might make a constitutional argument
requiring taping. 232

One would be hard-pressed to argue against the efficacy of taping. But
as developed below, taping does not solve all the problems with
voluntariness.233 First, though, one can see the advantages in taping
confessions in some well-documented cases. 23 4
Notably,
Worcester,
Massachusetts
police
interrogated
Vietnamese-American teenager Nga Truong about the murder of her infant
son. 25 Anyone unfamiliar with the video of her confession ought to watch
the full confession. 2 36 Several aspects of the confession are notable.
Consider how the case would have been resolved without the videotape.
The officers gave the suspect Miranda warnings and got a waiver of her
rights. 23 7 The interrogation lasted only about two hours. 238 The police
complied withMiranda.239 Beyond that, without the tape, officers might have
testified they questioned her without threatening her or otherwise coercing
her confession. 240 She might have testified to aggressive questioning and to
promises that the police never intended to honor. 24 ' As happens in most cases
involving officers and suspects testifying to different versions of the facts,
the court most likely would have found the confession complied with the
law. 24 2
Nga Truong won her suppression hearing, most importantly, because
the trial judge watched the videotaped confession. 2 43 The officers used
various techniques, often associated with the infamous Inbau-Reid manual,
for securing a confession. 2 44 Before her confession, the officers told her,
231. Slobogin, supra note 32, at 316-18.
232. Id.
233. See infra Part IV (discussing post-Miranda caselaw and the issues affecting lower courts).
234. See infra notes 235-56 and accompanying text (discussing cases where confessions were taped).
235. David Boeri, How a Teen's Coerced Confession Set Her Free, NPR (Dec. 30, 2013, 3:22 PM
ET), https://www.npr.org/2012/01/02/144489360/how-a-teens-coerced-confession-set-her-free.
236. See generally David Boeri, Woman in Tossed-Out Confession Gets $2.IM Settlement from
Worcester, WBUR (June 30, 2016), https://www.wbur.org/all-things-considered/2016/06/30/nga-truongworcester-settlement.
237. Commonwealth v. Truong, No. CV20090385, 2011 WL 1886500, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb.
25, 2011).
238. Boeri, supra note 235; Boeri, supra note 236.
239. Truong, 2011 WL 1886500, at *3.
240.

See, e.g., Joel Atlas, Tailored Police Testimony at Suppression Hearings, CORNELL FAC.

PUBL'NS (2002), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.bing
.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1871&context=facpub (last visited Sept. 8, 2020); see also Joseph
Goldstein, 'Testilying' by Police: A Stubborn Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.nytime
s.com/2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-police-perjury-new-york.html.
241. See Goldstein, supra note 240.
242. Id.
243. Boeri, supra note 235; Boeri, supra note 236.
244. Boeri, supra note 236; see also Coerced to Confess: How US Police Get Confessions, AL
JAZEERA (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/coerced-confess-police-
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falsely, that the officers wanted to help her. 24 5 The officers told her that as
soon as she confessed, she would remain in the juvenile justice system where
she would get help.2 46
Although not without some debate,2 47 the taped confession presents an
easy case for the court. It involved police misconduct-flagrant lies. 24 8 The
suspect was young, inexperienced with the criminal justice system, and
badgered by the officers. 2 49 She hardly looked as if she acted with anything
resembling full mental freedom.2 so
Nga Truong's case was easy, though, as probably are many other taped
confession cases. 2 51 But other widely watched confessions suggest taping
does not solve all the problems with the Court's voluntariness caselaw.
Consider Brendan Dassey's confession.2 52 According to the state, Dassey, at
the time a sixteen-year-old special-education student, confessed to assisting
his uncle, Steven Avery, sexually assault, mutilate, and murder Teresa
Halbach. 253 The state court denied Dassey's motion to suppress his
confession. 25 4 After his conviction and appeal through the state court system,
Dassey challenged his detention in the federal district court. 2 5 A federal
magistrate found for Dassey, a finding affirmed by a divided panel of the
Seventh Circuit and then by the Seventh Circuit en banc. 256 The en banc court
divided, four judges to three. 25 7
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
required a higher showing than would otherwise be required if Dassey's case

confessions-190313080319051.html (describing how police use the Inabu-Reid technique to coerce
confessions in the United States).
245. Commonwealth v. Truong, No. CV20090385, 2011 WL 1886500 at *4, *10 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2011).
246.

Id at *10.

247. Although many consider the interrogation as a clear example of improper police conduct
resulting in a false confession, not everyone agrees. See Anne M. Coughlin, InterrogationStories, 95 VA.
L. REV. 1599, 1601-03 (2009). For example, after showing my Criminal Procedure class her confession,
I polled the class. While 72% agreed that the confession was involuntary, over one-fourth found that it
was voluntary.

248. See Truong, 2011 WL 1886500, at *9-10; Boeri, supra note 235; Boeri, supra note 236.
249. Truong, 2011 WL 1886500, at *10.
250. Compare id. (describing Truong as young and inexperienced), with Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 230, 241 (1941) (describing petitioner as self-possessed and collected).
251.

See

FRONTLINE,

supra note 71;

see also The

Confession Tapes, NETFLIX (2017),

https://www.netflix.com/title/80161702.
252. Brendan Dassey: A True Story of a False Confession, YOUTUBE (May 9, 2016), https://www.yo
utube.com/watch?v=Z7jDf5wWdDQ; WATCH: BrendanDassey 'Confession' Videos & Trial Testimony,

HEAVY (Aug. 12, 2016, 9:36 PM), https://heavy.com/news/2016/08/brendan-dassey-confession-videoswatch-interrogation-police-trial-testimony-conviction-overturned-steven-avery-making-a-murderer-netfI
ix-okelly/.
253. Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 300-01, 310 (7th Cir. 2017).
254. Id. at 311.
255. Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 985 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
256. Id.; see also Dassey, 877 F.3d at 318 (affirming the magistrate judge's decision).
257. Dassey, 877 F.3d at 300.
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had not come into the federal court system via the writ of habeas corpus. 258
Nonetheless, much of what the court en banc said demonstrates the ad hoc
assessment of a voluntariness claim. 259
After reviewing relevant caselaw dealing with voluntariness, the court
en banc recognized Dassey's case involved factors pointing in opposite
directions. 2 0 Most importantly, offender characteristics favored a finding of
involuntariness; but the police conduct was not so bad, even if a little bit
bad. 26 ' Here are a few details, favoring a finding of voluntariness:
Over the next three hours, Dassey was repeatedly offered food, drinks,
restroom breaks, and opportunities to rest. At no point in the interview did
the investigators threaten Dassey or his family. Nor did they attempt to
intimidate him physically. They did not even raise their voices. Neither
investigator tried to prevent Dassey from leaving the room, nor did they use
any sort of force to compel him to answer questions. Dassey never refused
to answer questions, never asked to have counsel or his mother present, and
never tried to stop the interview. 262

But the police misled the sixteen-year-old. Here are some of those details:
Sensing that Dassey 'may have held back for whatever reasons,' the officer
assured Dassey 'that Mark and I both are in your corner, we're on your
side.' Acknowledging Dassey's potential concern that talking to the police
meant he 'might get arrested and stuff like that,' the investigator urged
Dassey to 'tell the whole truth, don't leave anything out.' Talking could be
in Dassey's best interest even though it 'might make you look a little bad or
make you look like you were more involved than you wanna be,' because
admitting to unfortunate facts would leave 'no doubt you're telling the
truth.' The first investigator closed by saying that 'from what I'm seeing,
even if I filled' in some holes in Dassey's story, 'I'm thinkin' you're all
right. OK, you don't have to worry about things ... [W]e know what Steven
[Avery] did ... we just need to hear the whole story from you.' 263

There was more. The second officer stated as follows:
Honesty here Brendan is the thing that's gonna help you. OK, no matter
what you did, we can work through that. OK. We can't make any promises
but we'll stand behind you no matter what you did. OK. Because you're
being the good guy here .... And by you talking with us, it's, it's helping

258.
104-32,
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 301-03; see also The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
110 Stat. 1214 (requiring federal courts to give deference to findings by state courts).
Dassey, 877 F.3d at 305.
Id. at 305-311.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 307.
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you. OK? Because the honest person is the one who's gonna get a better
deal out of everything. 264

Yes, the officers stated that they could not make promises. 26s Ask what an
intellectually challenged sixteen-year-old would believe when officers told
him that they were standing behind him? Would he think he would end up
with a life-sentence? Is that a "better deal" than he would have received had
he not confessed? After confessing, Brendan believed that he would be free
to go home to resume playing video games. 2 66 That seems to undercut any
claim that he understood what he confessed freely.
Chief Judge Wood's three-judge dissent focused not only on Dassey's
low IQ and other offender characteristics but also on ways in which the police
suggested details that Dassey later "admitted to." 267 As Judge Wood stated,
"the confession is so riddled with input from the police that its use violates

due process."268
Watch the videos both of Nga Truong and Brendan Dassey's
interrogations. Both are young, but Truong is not intellectually challenged. 2 69
Dassey is. 270 Her interrogators are more aggressive than his. 271 But both sets
of interrogators deceive their "prey;" that is, the police obviously believe that
their suspect is guilty. 272 Voluntariness is in the eyes of the beholder. Truong
is free; 2 73 Dassey may eventually be released, perhaps in 2048.274 Taping
helps, perhaps, a great deal, but it does not solve a core problem that Miranda
hoped to remedy: the hope for clear rules that would protect vulnerable
suspects. 275

264. Id.
265. Id. at 316.
266. See id. at 312 ("The officers' questioning included general assurances of leniency if he told the
truth, and Dassey may have believed they promised more than they did.").
267. Id. at 319-31 (Wood, C.J., Rovner & Williams, J.J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 319.
269. Commonwealth v. Truong, No. CV20090385, 2011 WL 1886500, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb.
25, 2011) (discussing Nga's characteristics and other circumstances that made her vulnerable to policy
pressure).
270. Dassey, 877 F.3d at 312.
271. Compare Boeri, supra note 235 (showing police repeatedly swearing at Nga, stating that she was
being untruthful, and suggesting that Nga killed her brother who had died years earlier) with, HEAVY,
supra note 252 (showing police repeatedly encouraging Brendan to be honest and tell everything he knew,
even if it was against Brendan's best interest).
272. Compare Boeri, supra note 235 (showing police repeatedly swearing at Nga, stating that she was
being untruthful, and suggesting that Nga killed her brother who had died years earlier) with, HEAVY,
supra note 252 (showing police repeatedly encouraging Brendan to be honest and tell everything he knew,
even if it was against Brendan's best interest).
273. And won a judgment against the police. See Boeri, supra note 235; Boeri, supra note 236.
274.

See Mariel Padilla, Brendan Dassey of 'Making a Murderer'Is Denied Clemency, N.Y. TIMES

(Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/21/us/brendan-dassey-pardon-making-a-murderer.ht
ml (noting Dassey is not eligible for parole until 2048).
275. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42, 445 (1966).
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The Court's voluntariness caselaw was not only attempting to prevent
innocent suspects from confessing. One hopes that the result in Brown would
be the same even if the police developed independent corroboration that the
suspects were guilty. 276 That is at least one area where clarity exists. 2 77
Beyond that, imagine that you were advising police officers on how to
comply with the Court's voluntariness standards. Could you come up with
any clear rules other than, "don't beat the suspect?"
Many police departments continue to adhere to the much-discredited
Inbau-Reid methods. 2 78 They do so despite serious concerns those methods
can lead to false confessions. 279 The Court might reject outright some of the
methods recommended in Inbau-Reid. For example, as Miranda observed,
one recommendation in the Inbau-Reid manual was to isolate the suspect. 20
Although the Court might not be willing to micromanage interrogations to
such a degree under constitutional protections, certainly a legislature could
mandate interrogations be held in open court or otherwise in a place not
dominated by the police. 28
The most challenging aspect of voluntariness is the use of trickery. In
an early voluntariness case, the Court held that a confession was inadmissible
"if any degree of influence has been exerted." 28 2 No one can seriously
contend that is still the law. In fact, the Court has acknowledged some
276. As a result of the attack on 9/11, some commentators, including Harvard Emeritus Professor
Alan Derschowitz, have argued in favor of torture warrants. David Kohn, Legal Torture?, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 17, 2002), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/legal-torture/. That is, under certain compelling
circumstances, police might be authorized to use torture to secure vital information. See DRESSLER ET AL.,
supra note 71, at 576. See also David Kohn, supra note 76. To date, the Court has not authorized such
warrants. Facts on Torture, HUM. RTS. FIRST, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaigns/never-

torture/facts-torture (last visited Oct. 14, 2021). Also, some commentators have cast doubt that torture
produces accurate information and is less likely than other methods to do so. ALI H. SOUFAN, THE BLACK
BANNERS 387, 389, 423 (2011).

277. Lisenba, where even the police admitted to slapping the suspect, might appear to contradict this
general statement. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 230 (1941). But at least in the Court's view there,
the police use of violence did not result in the confession. Id. at 240-41. Instead, the confession came
much later, after the suspect had been released initially and now had regained mental composure. Id.
278. DRESSLER ET AL., supranote 71, at 729-30.
279. Id.; see generally TOM WELLS & RICHARD A. LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: MURDER, FALSE
CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008) (detailing the false accusations of rape and murder against

seven men in Norfolk, Virginia).
280. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 (1966) ("The officers are told by the manuals that
the 'principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being alone with
the person under interrogation."').
281. This Article does not address a variety of legislative solutions that would protect innocent
suspects. Some commentators have suggested a few such reforms that would help a great deal. See e.g.,
Caplan, supra note 1, at 1432, 1475 n. 271; Slobogin, supra note 32, at 310; Paul M. Bator & James
Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible
Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 62, 73 (1966) ("[T]he concept of involuntariness seems to be
used by the courts as a shorthand to refer to practices which are repellent to civilized standards of decency
or which, under the circumstances, are thought to apply a degree of pressure to an individual which
unfairly impairs his capacity to make a rational choice."). For a summary of state legislative responses to
Miranda, see MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROC. § 140.8 note (AM. L. INST. 1975).
282. Bramv. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1987).
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trickery is permissible, or at least, is alone insufficient to make a confession
involuntary. 28 3

Lower courts have tried to resolve cases involving fabricated
evidence.284 While recognizing the absence of a bright-line rule with regard
to false statements to a suspect, one court held that a confession was
inadmissible if the police fabricated test results. 285 Some countries discourage
any form of trickery and train police to engage suspects with open minds
about the suspects' guilt or innocence. 286 I doubt that the Court would adopt
any similar bright-line rules. 28 7
Most courts, including the Supreme Court, dealing with trickery, do not
present a coherent theory about line-drawing. 288 Some discussions of
interrogation techniques offer plausible ways to draw the line between legal
and illegal misstatements to suspects. 289 Notably, prominent evidence scholar
John Henry Wigmore urged that the test be focused on reliability. 290 He
argued the question should be, "Was the inducement of a nature calculated
under the circumstances to induce a confession irrespective of its truth or
falsity?" 291
One can imagine legislative solutions that can improve upon the Court's
voluntariness test. For now, however, the question worth asking is whether
the voluntariness test might be improved to avoid such ad hoc cases like those
discussed above.
At the outset, we now know state action is a necessary condition, and
police cannot use physical force to extract confessions. 2 92 We know some
amount of trickery is permissible.2 93 Here, adhering to Wigmore's test might

283. See, e.g., Frazierv. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).
284. See, e.g., State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Jackson, 304
S.E.2d 134, 145 (N.C. 1983); Sheriff, Washoe Cnty. v. Bessey 914 P.2d 618, 618 (Nev. 1996);
Whittington v. State, 809 A.2d 721, 723 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
285. See Cayward, 552 So. 2d at 972.
286.

See DRESSLER ET AL., supranote 71, at 577.

287. Of course, a legislature could adopt such a rule. Again, while a legislature could do so, there
seems little momentum in that direction.
288. For a good example of how the Supreme Court's voluntariness caselaw works currently, see
Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 303-305 (7th Cir. 2017).
289. See WIGMORE, supra note 73, at 154-55.
290. Id.
291. See id. at 1534.
292. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (noting to be voluntary confessions must
be free of physical and psychological force).
293. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (concluding that the fact that police in
interrogation of the defendant falsely told the defendant that the defendant's companion had confessed,
though relevant, was insufficient to make otherwise voluntary confession by defendant inadmissible); see
also Dassey, 877 F.3d at 303 (holding that, in deciding whether a confession is voluntary, "courts assess
'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details
of the interrogation"'; "[t]he purpose of this test is to determine whether 'the defendant's will was in fact
overborne"'); Gretchen Gavett, A Rare Look at the Police Tactics That Can Lead to False Confessions,

FRONTLINE (Dec. 9, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-rare-look-at-the-police-tactics-
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help courts draw clearer lines about the kinds of trickery that violate a
suspect's constitutional rights. Think back to a case like Nga Truong's
confession. 294 Apart from the officers' abusive conduct, the police told her
that she would leave the interrogation room and enter the juvenile system
where she would get help. 2 95 Would that induce an innocent person to confess
falsely? Observers might disagree about the answer to that question; but
posing the question in that way allows a more coherent discussion than does
the more open-ended voluntariness question.
Examining Dassey's confession in the same manner might have resulted
in a different outcome from the en banc court's decision. 296 As quoted above,
the officers made statements like this:
We can't make any promises but we'll stand behind you no matter what you
did. OK. Because you're being the good guy here .... And by you talking
with us, it's, it's helping you. OK? Because the honest person is the one
who's gonna get a better deal out of eveything. 297

Would a suspect confess falsely with such inducements? Wouldn't a suspect
told he will help himself by cooperating with his interrogators have induced
him to say whatever they wanted to hear? Again, the answer to that question
might be debatable, but the question is better than the ones the Seventh
Circuit en banc considered. 298 The majority in Dassey v. Dittmann never
addressed that question. 2 99
The same question might provide clearer answers than the more general
voluntariness focus in other cases of trickery as well. Imagine false
statements about DNA evidence found at a crime scene. An innocent suspect
almost certainly would not confess because of such trickery. She should
realize that the police are bluffing-at least in most cases. 300
I do not pretend focusing on whether police tactics are likely to lead to
false confessions solves all problems of uncertainty. Take the previous
example: we know from examination of false-confession cases that some
suspects are so confused about the surrounding circumstances they end up

that-can-lead-to-false-confessions/; Cynthia J. Najdowski & Catherine L. Bonventre, Deception in the
InterrogationRoom, APA (May 2014), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/05/jn.

294. Commonwealth v. Truong, No. CV20090385, 2011 WL 1886500, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb.
25, 2011).
295. Id. at *3-4, *10.
296. See Dassey. 877 F.3d at 318.
297. Id. at 307.
298. Id. at 300-01.
299. Id. at 312-13.
300. See Gavett, supra note 293; see also Najdowski & Bonventre, supra note 293 ("[Police] are able
to use a variety of powerful psychological ploys to extract confessions from criminal suspects, including
the use of deception during interrogation.").
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confessing.3 0' Imagine someone who was intoxicated or mentally impaired
who was told that an eyewitness identified him at the scene; the suspect might
confess out of confusion.30 2 One can find cases of false confessions.3 03 That
is, suspect characteristics would have to remain relevant.
My point here is that focusing on likelihood of false confessions narrows
the inquiry somewhat. It also adds protection to those most deserving of
protection in the custodial setting. 304 Again, in Professor Alschuler's words,
"the most knowledgeable, cunning, and steely criminals" 305 are less likely to
confess falsely than innocent offenders who lack sophistication in dealing
with the police. 306
The Miranda Court was openly critical of the Inbau-Reid methods. 307
But it did not outlaw such techniques. 308 The Court, perhaps naively, thought
the warnings would give suspects confidence to protect themselves against
such practices. 309 While I doubt the Court would hold those techniques are
per se unlawful, focusing closely on whether police practices are likely to
induce an innocent person to confess would call into question many of the
specific techniques commonly used by police following Inbau-Reid
methods. 310
V. CONCLUSION

Many scholars now recognize Mirandaas a failure. 311 In recent years, I
have become aMirandaskeptic. 31 2 But while we may abandonMiranda and
while the Court has largely done so, 313 we need to be mindful the Court was
attempting to resolve significant legal issues. 31 4 Concerns about providing

301.

See, e.g., Douglas Starr, This PsychologistExplains Why People Confess to Crimes They Didn't

Commit, SCIENCEMAG (June 13, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/06/psycholog
ist-explains-why-people-confess-crimes-they-didn-t-commit.
302. See, e.g., Leo, supra note 71, at 335-36.
303.

See, e.g., Starr, supra note 301; Leo, supra note 71.

304. See supra Part IV (discussing how certain defendants are unable to deal with the inherent
coercion present in the custodial setting).
305. Howe, supra note 187, at 906.
306. Alschuler, supra note 21, at 906.
307. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966).
308. Buffie B. Merryman, ArgumentsAgainst Use ofthe Reid TechniquesforJuvenile Interrogations,
10 COMM. L. REV. 16, 22 (2010).
309. See supra Part II (explaining how the Court intervened in cases with questionable confessions).
310. See supra Part IV (discussing various police interrogation tactics, including Inabu-Reid in cases
such as Nga Truong).
311. See supraPart II (discussing common criticisms of Miranda); see also Alschuler, supra note 21,
at 2626-27, 2629-30; Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda's Fourfold Failure, 97 B.U. L. REv. 849, 850-54,
891 (2017); A Thirty-Year Perspective, supra note 21, at 1062-63; A Review of Fifty Years, supra note
21, at 848; Loewy, supra note 5, at 434-35.
312. Vitiello, supranote 4, at 63.
313. See supra Part II (discussing the abandonment of Miranda).
314. See supra Part II (discussing the reasons and justifications for Miranda).
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guidelines to prevent police abuse and reducing inequality among suspects
remain important goals of our criminal justice system. 3 15
As Mirandabegan its disappearing act, lawyers and courts rediscovered
voluntariness. 316 Voluntariness is now more important in many confession
3 17
cases than is compliance with Miranda.
Indeed, as I have argued, the
voluntariness test does a better job of protecting the right set of suspects than
does Miranda. 8 But still an open question is the extent to which the
voluntariness test can provide meaningful guidance without serving merely
as a Rorschach test.319
Since Miranda,the Court has resolved some problems with uncertainty
about its voluntariness test. 320 State action is a necessary condition for a
voluntariness claim. 32 1 I have argued voluntariness questions become more
carefully focused when one asks the question Professor Wigmore insisted
was the important one: Are the police inducements "calculated to induce a
confession without regard to its truthfulness?" 3 22 That does not create bright
lines in all cases, but it does give courts a clearer focus about what is at
stake. 323 It also does tend to help suspects most in need of help in the custodial
setting.324

315. See supraPart IV (discussing reassessments made to ensure the protection of suspects).
316. See supra Part III (discussing the abandonment of Miranda).
317. See supra notes 188, 194 and accompanying text (discussing the voluntariness issue in Spano
and the ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel).
318. See supra Part IV (discussing the benefits of the voluntariness test).
319. See supra Part IV (discussing the benefits and limitations of the voluntariness test).
320. See supra PartsIII & IV (discussing the abandonment of Miranda and the implications of the
reemergence of the voluntariness test).
321. See supra Part IV (discussing the Colorado v. Connelly decision and the requirement of state
action).
322. See supra Part II (discussing Brown v. Mississippi and the coercive nature of police
interrogations, which often lead to false confessions).
323. See supra Part IV (discussing the absence of a bright-line rule in the Supreme Court's
voluntariness case law).
324. See supra Part IV (discussing those most vulnerable to coercive police techniques used to induce
confessions, which often reduce reliability).

